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10	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
11	FOR THE COUNTY OF	F LOS ANGELES	
12	CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY .)	CASE NO. BC 052395	
13	INTERNATIONAL, a California not-for-profit)		
14	religious corporation,)	PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY	
15)	ADJUDICATION OF THE TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF	
16	Plaintiff,))	PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT	
17	vs.	THEREOF	
18)	DATE: March 31, 1993 TIME: 8:30 a.m.	
19	GERALD ARMSTRONG; DOES 1 through	DEPT: 30	
20	25, inclusive,)		
21	Defendants.)	DISC.CUT-OFF: Apr. 2, 1993 MTN CUT-OFF: Apr. 19, 1993 TRIAL DATE: May 3, 1993	
22		THIAL DATE. IVIDY 3, 1993	
23	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 31, 1993, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon		
24	thereafter as may be heard in Department 30 of the above-entitled Court located at		
25	111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California, plaintiff Church of Scientology		
26	International ("the Church") will move this Court to issue an order granting		
27	summary adjudication of plaintiff's Twelfth Cause of Action (for permanent		
28	injunction for breach of contract) in favor of the Church, pursuant to California		
- 1			

Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c. This Motion is made on the grounds that there is no triable issue of any material fact relevant to plaintiff's claim for injunction relief, and that the Church is entitled to judgment on the Twelfth Cause of Action as a matter of law.

This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the pleadings, records and files herein, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the declarations and exhibits filed herewith, the accompanying Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and such other evidence as may be adduced properly at the hearing of this Motion.

Dated: March 2, 1993

Respectfully submitted,

Andrew H. Wilson WILSON, RYAN & CAMPILONGO

BOWLEŞ & MOXON

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY

INTERNATIONAL

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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In December, 1986, plaintiff Church of Scientology International ("the Church" or "plaintiff") sought to end bitter and protracted litigation with former Church staff member Gerald Armstrong ("Armstrong" or "defendant"). Armstrong had been expelled from the Scientology religion after stealing confidential documents belonging to the religion's Founder, L. Ron Hubbard. He later embarked upon a campaign of activities, both overt and covert, intended to: divide Church members from the ecclesiastical leaders of the Church; forge incriminating documents and plant them in Church files in advance of an orchestrated raid on Church facilities coordinated by Armstrong and government agents to "discover" and seize the forged documents planted in Church files; and, get Church members to disaffect and file lawsuits against the Church on the basis of naked allegations unsupportable by any evidence. In Armstrong's own words, "we don't have to prove a goddamn thing. We don't have to prove s--t; we just have to allege it."

[Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 12]

Armstrong's lengthy campaign was ended, or so plaintiff thought, when he entered into a confidential Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") with plaintiff in 1986. [Sep.St. No. 1] The terms of the Agreement required Armstrong not merely to end his own litigation against plaintiff, but among other things, it also required Armstrong to refrain from aiding others in litigation, to return to the Church the documents which he had stolen and all copies of them, to refrain from discussing with third parties his experiences with the Scientology faith, and to keep confidential all terms of the Agreement itself. In exchange for his promises, Armstrong admittedly received \$800,000 from the Church. [Sep.St.Nos. 12-14]

The Church has fully performed all of its obligations pursuant to the Agreement. The facts are undisputed, however, that Armstrong has breached the Agreement repeatedly and deliberately. Because of these breaches, a preliminary injunction was issued by the Court on May 28, 1992. Rather than complying with

that injunction, Armstrong defiantly proclaimed under oath that he will not be compelled to comply with the terms of the Agreement by anyone, saying:

I have absolutely no intention of honoring that settlement agreement. I cannot. I cannot logically. I cannot ethically. I cannot morally. I cannot psychically. I cannot philosophically. I cannot spiritually. I cannot in any way. And it is firmly my intention to not honor it.

- Q. No matter what a court says?
- A. No court could order it. They're going to have to kill me. [Sep.St.No. 20]

True to his word, Armstrong has continued to violate the terms of the Agreement and the preliminary injunction. To prevent a multiplicity of future actions for breach, and to prevent the irreparable harm that inevitably results from the sort of fanatical defiance which Armstrong exhibits, the Church seeks a permanent injunction by this motion.

With no facts in dispute, interpretation of the meaning and effect of the contractual provisions which support the Church's request for a permanent injunction enforcing the contract is a matter of law for the Court, and judgment on the Twelfth Cause of Action should be entered in the Church's favor on this motion for summary adjudication.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Settlement Agreement

In December, 1986, the Church entered into the Agreement with Armstrong. The Agreement provided for a mutual release and waiver of all claims arising out of a cross-complaint which defendant Armstrong had filed in Church of Scientology of California v. Gerald Armstrong, Los Angeles Superior Court No. C 420153.¹ The

The signatories to the Agreement were Gerald Armstrong and the Church of Scientology International, by its President, Heber Jentzsch. [Sep.St.Nos. 1, 2] (All references to evidence are to the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, concurrently filed, which provides, by number, a full reference to the evidence in (continued...)

were not spawned or encouraged by the conclusion of the old one. In particular, various paragraphs of the Agreement provided that Armstrong: (1) would not provide voluntary aid or advice to others litigating against the Church; (2) would not create or publish, or assist another in creating or publishing, any media publication or broadcast, concerning information about the Church of Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, or any other persons or entities released by the Agreement; (3) would maintain "strict confidentiality and silence" with respect to his alleged experiences with the Church or any knowledge he might have concerning the Church, L. Ron Hubbard, or other Scientology-related entities and individuals; and (4) would not disclose any documents which related to the Church or other protected entities and individuals.

Armstrong admittedly received \$800,000 as his portion of a total settlement paid to his attorney, Michael Flynn, in a block settlement concerning all of Mr. Flynn's clients who were in litigation with any Church of Scientology or related entity. [Sep.St.No. 14]

B. Armstrong's Admitted Breaches Of The Agreement

That Armstrong repeatedly has breached the above-described paragraphs of the Agreement is not in dispute. Evidence consisting of Armstrong's own admissions illuminates at least the following deliberate breaches by Armstrong:

In July, 1991, Armstrong provided voluntary aid and assistance to

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support of this motion. References will be made to "Sep.St.No." for "Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, Fact Number .") Mr. Armstrong's signature was witnessed by JoAnn Richardson and Michael Sutter, and the Agreement was signed with approval as to form and content by Mr. Armstrong's attorney, Michael Flynn. [Sep.St.Nos. 3, 4]

See specifically ¶¶ 7(H), 7(G), 10, 7(D), 18(D), 20 of the Agreement. [Exhibit A to Sep. St.]

Joseph Yanny, an attorney for Vicki and Richard Aznaran ("the Aznarans") in the Aznarans' litigation against the Church, in violation of paragraphs 10 and 7(G) of the Agreement;³

- In July, 1991, Armstrong provided aid to Yanny in Yanny's own litigation against the Church and related entities, including giving Yanny declarations disclosing the confidential terms of the Agreement, in violation of paragraphs 10, 7(G) and 18(D) of the Agreement;⁴
- From August, 1991 until at least July, 1992, Armstrong provided aid to the Aznarans' current attorney, Ford Greene, in the Aznarans' litigation against the Church, including providing the Aznarans with declarations about his own experiences with Scientology, the terms of the Agreement, and documents concerning Scientology, in violation of paragraphs 10, 7(G), 7(D) and 18(D) of the

The Aznarans are former Church members currently engaged in litigation against CSI and others. In June, 1991, the Aznarans discharged their attorney, Ford Greene, and retained Joseph A. Yanny to represent them. [Am.Compl., ¶¶ 18 -19] While counsel for the Aznarans, Yanny hired Armstrong, in Yanny's own words "as a paralegal to help [Yanny] on the Aznaran case." In a holographic declaration supplied to Yanny, Armstrong admitted that Yanny called him on July 10, 1991, and asked for Armstrong's help in Yanny's representation of the Aznarans; that Armstrong agreed to help Yanny with the Aznarans' case; that he would travel to Los Angeles for that express purpose on July 12, 1991; and that Armstrong asked Yanny to pay him \$500 for his services. Armstrong admits that he did travel to Los Angeles, did stay with Yanny on July 15 and 16, and wrote a declaration for Yanny and the Aznarans. Yanny has also admitted that he hired Armstrong as a paralegal against the Church and other related entities. [Sep.St. Nos. 30, 37]

After Yanny entered his appearance for the Aznarans and indicated to Church counsel that he represented Armstrong as well, the Church and two related entities sued Yanny in this Court. In that proceeding, Yanny filed two declarations prepared and executed by Armstrong in which Armstrong asserts knowledge of settlements, including his own, which he purportedly gleaned by working as a paralegal for yet another law firm. The declarations were offered by Yanny as part of Yanny's defense. Moreover, Armstrong attached a copy of the Agreement as an exhibit to one of the declarations. [Sep.St.Nos. 31 - 32]

Agreement;5

• In March, 1992, Armstrong provided media interviews to reporters from, inter alia, Cable News Network, and <u>The American Lawyer</u>, in which he discussed his experiences with Scientology and the terms of the Agreement, in violation of paragraphs 7(D) and 18(D) of the Agreement;⁶

o In March, 1992, Armstrong provided aid to lawyers for litigants opposing a Church-affiliated entity in the case of <u>Hunziker et al. v. Applied Materials et al.</u>, Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No. 692629, discussing with them for hours his experiences in Scientology, providing them with documents, and voluntarily agreeing to appear for them as an "expert witness" on the subject of Scientology,

My help to Ford Greene in all of the papers recently filed has been in proofreading, copying, collating, hole-punching, stapling, stamping, packaging, labeling, air freighting, and mailing. Mr. Greene and I have had several conversations during this period, some of which certainly concerned the litigation.

[ld.]

As Greene's paralegal, Armstrong has, since July, 1992, further admitted to "broadly discussing" with the Aznarans matters concerning their case against the Church and assisting in the relay of communications between the Aznarans and Greene. [Id.] See also, the Church's concurrently filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action ("Liquidated Damages Motion"), pp. 7 - 8, and the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts thereto, Nos. 14 - 15, incorporated herein by reference.

After Yanny's substitution into the Aznarans' case was summarily vacated, Ford Greene was reinstated as the Aznarans' counsel of record. In a letter to the Church's counsel dated August 21, 1991, Armstrong admitted that he had been working at Greene's office with Greene on the Aznarans' case, helping him to prepare responses to summary judgment motions filed in that case. [Sep.St.No. 16] Both Armstrong and Greene freely admitted in sworn declarations that Greene employed Armstrong as a paralegal in the <u>Aznaran</u> case, even after this case was filed. [Sep.St.Nos. 17-18] Armstrong himself described his activities as follows:

See the Liquidated Damages Motion, pp. 8 - 9, and the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts thereto, Nos. 13 - 17.

in violation of paragraphs 7(D), 7(G) and 10 of the Agreement;7

- O In May, 1992, Armstrong provided aid to lawyers for David Mayo and Church of the New Civilization, litigants opposing the Church in the consolidated case of Religious Technology Center et al. v. Scott et al., and Religious Technology Center, et al. v. Wollersheim, et al., United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case Nos. CV 85-711 JMI(Bx) and CV 85-7197 JMI(Bx) discussing with them his experiences in Scientology, and providing them with a declaration, in violation of paragraphs 7(D), 7(G) and 10 of the Agreement;⁸
- o In 1992, Armstrong provided aid to Ed Roberts, interviewing him at least seven times concerning Roberts' claims against the Church, and writing to Church lawyers seeking a "settlement" on Roberts' behalf, in violation of paragraphs 7(G) and 10 of the Agreement;⁹
- In November, 1992, Armstrong engaged in a lengthy, videotaped interview concerning his purported Church experiences with Church litigation adversary Jerry Whitfield and others, in violation of paragraphs 7(D), 7(G), 10 and 18(D) of the Agreement.¹⁰

See the Liquidated Damages Motion, pp. 9 - 10, and the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts thereto, Nos. 18 - 22.

See the Liquidated Damages Motion, pg. 10, and the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts thereto, Nos. 24 - 25.

Armstrong has admitted both to aiding Mr. Roberts by acting as Greene's paralegal, and on his own. In a letter of December 22, 1992, Armstrong asserted that he "is the only person in the world willing to help Mr. Roberts against your organization." In that letter, Armstrong includes the payment of an unspecified amount to Mr. Roberts as a "condition" to the ending of Armstrong's campaign of harassment against the Church. [Sep.St.No. 35]

Whitfield, a self-proclaimed "specialist" in the "deprogramming" of Church of Scientology parishioners, is currently a defendant in a false imprisonment and false arrest suit brought by Church staff member Angel Casillas, <u>Angel Casillas v. Jerry Whitfield, Hana Whitfield and Does 1-25</u>, Los Angeles Municipal Court Case No. 91K49349.

C. Armstrong's Intention To Commit Future Breaches

Armstrong's intention to continue to breach the Agreement, regardless of the consequences, is also not in dispute. On May 28, 1992, this Court issued a preliminary injunction in this case, which is in effect, and which provided in relevant part:

Defendant Gerald Armstrong, his agents, and persons acting in concert or conspiracy with him (excluding attorneys at law who are not said defendant's agents or retained by him) are restrained and enjoined during the pendency of this suit pending further order of this court from doing directly or indirectly any of the following:

Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) intending to make, intending to press, intending to arbitrate, or intending to litigate a claim against the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the "Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement" of December 1986 regarding such claim or regarding pressing, arbitrating or litigating it.

Voluntarily assisting any person (not a governmental organ or entity) arbitrating or litigating a claim against the persons referred to in sec. 1 of the "Mutual Release of All Claims and Settlement Agreement" of December, 1986.

[Sep.St.No. 29]¹¹ These particular prohibitions against Armstrong voluntarily assisting litigants and other claimants were based on paragraph 7G of the Agreement, which this Court found the Church held a reasonable probability of enforcing after trial.

Less than a month after the May 28 Order was issued, Armstrong asserted under oath in deposition that he would not honor either its terms or those of the Agreement:

I have absolutely no intention of honoring that settlement agreement. I cannot. I cannot logically. I cannot ethically. I cannot morally. I cannot psychically. I cannot philosophically. I cannot spiritually. I cannot in any way. And it is firmly my intention to not

At the time of the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the Church was not aware of many of Armstrong's breaches, which have since been revealed. Armstrong's interviews with the media and creation of the videotape, for example, were not presented to the Court in the Church's request for preliminary injunction. In seeking permanent injunction, the Church requests an expansion of the preliminary injunction that would prohibit all of the violations of the Agreement proven herein.

honor it.

Q. No matter what a court says?

A. No court could order it. They're going to have to kill me. [Sep.St.No. 20]

Armstrong's intention to ignore both the Agreement and the May 28 Order was reiterated in a letter sent by Armstrong to plaintiff's counsel, dated December 22, 1992. In that letter, which is copied to his own attorneys but not sent by them, 12 Armstrong threatens that if he is not paid \$500,000 and this lawsuit dismissed, he intends to travel to South Africa to testify against a Church of Scientology, give interviews to the media, and assist anyone and everyone opposing Churches that he can locate. [Sep.St.No. 28] Expressing the viewpoint that the May 28 Order places no restrictions whatsoever on his conduct, Armstrong states:

I consider myself free to do anything anyone can, except testify absent a subpoena. Much of what I am permitted to do I am going to do. . . .

I will continue to associate with and befriend all those people I consider you attack unjustly and senselessly. I will make my knowledge and support available to the Cult Awareness Network, a group of people of good will you vilify, in all the litigation you have fomented against them 13.... I will even make my knowledge and support available to entities like <u>Time</u> and people like Rich Behar in

In what can only be described as deliberate harassment, Armstrong also sent copies of the letter to 35 individuals and groups, including anti-Church litigants, such as Vicki and Richard Aznaran, Larry Wollersheim and Joseph Yanny, and lawyers who represent clients in actions brought against one of more churches, including Toby Plevin, John Elstead and Daniel Leipold.

The Cult Awareness Network is an anti-religious group that advocates the kidnapping and forcible "deprogramming" of individuals belonging to religions which they have identified as "cults." While the Church is not presently suing the Cult Awareness Network in any litigation, the president of the Cult Awareness Network, Cynthia Kisser, has initiated an action against the Church and its president, Heber Jentzsch. [Sep.St.No. 21]

their defenses from your attacks.14

[Sep.St.No. 26] In that same letter, Armstrong makes plain the personal contempt which he has for a court which would rule against him:

There is also, as mentioned above, the fact that in order to defend myself from your attacks and to fund the defense of the litigation you have fomented I must speak and must publish. I'm sure you understand that I remain completely confident that no court, other than the odd one your mercenaries are able to compromise with bucks, babes or bull, will order me not to defend myself.

[Sep.St.No. 27]

Moreover, while making the videotape in November, 1992, Armstrong was fully aware that his actions were in violation of the Agreement, but persisted nonetheless, saying:

I cannot, except pursuant to a subpoena, assist someone intending to file a claim or pressing a claim against the organization. Now then we are appealing even that narrow ruling, because that's unenforceable because if you construe that my ... that this video could possibly indirectly help someone in the future, I can't do this. And not only that but if you consider that my existence indirectly or directly helps someone, then I'll oblige to take my own life. In other words I must stop breathing.

[Sep.St.No. 24]

III. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

A. The Necessity Of A Permanent Injunction May Be Determined By Summary Adjudication

A motion for summary adjudication "shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c). Moreover, under a provision recently added to the Code of Civil Procedure:

(n) For purposes of motions for summary judgment and summary adjudication:

Behar is the author of a <u>Time</u> cover story concerning the Church which ran in May, 1991. The Church is presently engaged in a lawsuit against <u>Time</u> and Behar for defamation. [Sep.St.No. 22]

(1) a plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on that cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action.

C.C.P. § 437c(n)(1). As demonstrated below, and in the Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts, the Church has met its burden by proving, from Armstrong's own admissions, each element of the cause for injunctive relief.

Once the moving party has shown the nonexistence of a factual dispute as to a material fact, the party opposing the motion can avoid summary adjudication only by presenting evidence tending to demonstrate that there exists a triable issue of material fact. See, e.g., University of Southern California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1036, 272 Cal.Rptr. 264.

Indeed, courts have found summary adjudication to be particularly appropriate for resolving a cause of action for breach of a written contract. "Where there is no conflict as to the terms of a contract, and where its provisions are not uncertain or ambiguous, its 'meaning and effect * * * and the relation of the parties to it thereby created * * * become a question of law to be decided by the court.'" Nizuk v. Georges (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 699, 705, 4 Cal.Rptr. 565, 570 (citations omitted) (liability under written employment contract properly decided on motion for summary judgment). Permanent injunctive relief may be had without trial where, as here, the facts which support issuance of the permanent injunction are undisputed. Camp v. Mendocino County Board of Supervisors (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 334, 357-358, 176 Cal.Rptr. 620, 635.

B. <u>An Injunction May Be Granted To Prevent The Breach Of A Contract The Performance Of Which Would Be Specifically Enforced</u>

C.C.P. § 526 empowers the court to grant an injunction to prevent a breach of a contract if the contract is one which may be specifically enforced. C.C.P. § 526; see also, Steinmeyer v. Warner Consolidated Corp. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d

515, 518, 116 Cal.Rptr. 57, 60 ("An injunction cannot be granted to prevent breach of a contract which is not specifically enforceable."); Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Greater Los Angeles v. Al Malaikah Auditorium Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 207, 281 Cal.Rptr. 216. The Agreement at issue is one which may be specifically enforced by this Court as the contract is sufficiently definite and certain in its terms, it is just and reasonable, the plaintiff has performed its side of the bargain, Armstrong has breached the contract, the Agreement was supported by adequate consideration, and the Church's remedy at law is inadequate. Taramind Lithography Workshop, Inc. v. Sanders (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d. 571, 575, 193 Cal.Rptr. 409, 410.

A permanent injunction may be granted to prevent breach of contract "[w]here pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief" or "[w]here the restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings." Civil Code § 3422(1), (3). As demonstrated below, both of these circumstances are present in this case.

Civil Code § 3389 expressly provides that a liquidated damages provision does not preclude a contract from being specifically enforceable. Accordingly, the Court is empowered to grant a permanent injunction to enjoin Armstrong from further breach, not withstanding that <u>some</u>, but not all, of the clauses in the settlement agreement provide for liquidated damages.

C. <u>Prevention Of Irreparable Injury And Avoidance Of Multiplicity Of Actions</u> Requires The Court To Issue A Permanent Injunction

This Court has already issued a preliminary injunction enforcing the settlement agreement. Moreover, Scientology's former Mother Church, the Church of Scientology of California ("CSC"), has already obtained injunctions and specific performance of similar settlement agreements. Thus, while C.C.P. § 526(5) deters the granting of injunctions to prevent the breach of a contract "the performance of which would not be specifically enforced," this Agreement is patently specifically

enforceable. In <u>Wakefield v. Church of Scientology of California</u> (11th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 1226 (Ex. R), CSC obtained specific performance of an agreement substantially similar to this Agreement. CSC moved to enforce the provisions of the settlement agreement, and the district court ordered hearings before the magistrate judge, who concluded that Wakefield had violated the agreement. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and issued a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Wakefield from violating the agreement. <u>Id.</u>
When Wakefield violated the injunction, again making media appearances, CSC sought an order to show cause why Wakefield should not be held in contempt. At an <u>in camera</u> proceeding, the magistrate judge found that Wakefield had willfully violated the injunction, and recommended that the case be referred to the United States Attorney's office for criminal contempt proceedings. <u>Id.</u> at 4628.

Although the district court's issuance of the injunction in <u>Wakefield</u> was not at issue in the Eleventh Circuit proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit described in its opinion, "Wakefield's constant disregard and misuse of the judicial process," suggesting approval of the district court's actions. <u>Id</u>. at 4630.

Similarly, in McLean v. Church of Scientology of California (11th Cir. 1991) (Slip Op., Ex. S) plaintiff McLean also entered into a settlement agreement containing confidentiality provisions preventing her from discussing the litigation with anyone outside her immediate family. Id. at 2. By her own testimony, McLean admitted to reacquiring certain documents and using them to "counsel" Church members. She further admitted to discussing certain aspects of the suit with people outside her immediate family. Id. at 5. As a result, the appellate court affirmed the district court order permanently enjoining McLean from disclosing any information about her lawsuit and the resulting settlement agreement. Id. at 6.

Just as the district courts in <u>Wakefield</u> and <u>McLean</u> found it necessary to issue permanent injunctions to enforce the agreement of the parties, so should this Court issue a permanent injunction to enjoin Armstrong from further breaches

which he candidly promises.

1. The Church Will Be Irreparably Harmed Absent The Issuance Of An Injunction

This Court has already found in this case that the Church's legal remedies against Armstrong are inadequate. Order of May 28, 1992, ¶ 1. Not only is Armstrong assisting adversaries of the Church, he is doing so to foster and perpetuate relentless litigation against the Church to serve his own ends. Armstrong's conduct is continuous, oppressive and malicious and has been undertaken for the express purpose of injuring the Church. Even the Court's preliminary injunction order has been viewed so myopically by Armstrong as permitting him to violate the provisions of the Agreement not specifically enumerated in the injunction, instead of prohibiting him from future breaches. Only a detailed permanent injunction fully enforcing the contractual provisions has any hope of stopping Armstrong from waging his malicious, relentless war.

Although some of Armstrong's breaches are subject to a liquidated damages clause, others, including the continual violations which he is engaging in through his employment by Ford Greene, are not. It is these continual violations, which no monetary award can remedy, which must be permanently enjoined.

2. <u>Armstrong Must Be Permanently Enjoined To Prevent A Multiplicity Of Actions</u>

Armstrong has dramatically demonstrated, during the pendency of this action, just why a permanent injunction must issue if the Church is to have meaningful relief. Most of the breaches of the Agreement described in the Statement of Facts occurred <u>after</u> the initial complaint in this action was filed. While some of them were added to the Amended Complaint, the most recent events are not the subject of this action (except as to the Church's contempt proceedings against Armstrong), yet they are among the most egregious. Armstrong's videotape, made on November 6, 1992, is a 1 1/2-hour rendition by

Armstrong of his purported experiences with the Church, his interpretation of the Agreement, and a hate-filled diatribe against his former religion. It was provided to deprogrammer Jerry Whitfield for use in the forcible "persuasion" of Scientologists to abandon their faith; as such a tool, it easily could help to spawn additional litigation and strife. Armstrong's letter of December 22, 1992, threatens still more actions in violation of the Agreement, including the provision of aid to still more anti-Church litigants. If a permanent injunction does not issue and these threats are carried out by Armstrong, additional, repetitive litigation will be necessary for the Church to secure its rights pursuant to the Agreement.

3. A Balancing Of The Equities Requires The Court To Issue A Permanent Injunction

In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, the Court must balance the equities before it and exercise its discretion in favor of the party most likely to be injured. Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 205, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 402. In balancing the equities, the Court considers two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; and (2) the harm that plaintiff is likely to suffer if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm that defendants are likely to suffer if the injunction is granted. Id. at 206.

Armstrong has no equities whatsoever in this action. No one has any right to continue to violate a settlement agreement. Armstrong already has received the benefits of the Agreement, in the form of substantial monetary compensation. Armstrong's only "injury" if he is enjoined is that he will not be able to violate the Agreement in the future. On the other hand, the harm that will be suffered by

Armstrong argued unsuccessfully in response to the Church's request for a preliminary injunction that issuance of the injunction would infringe on his First Amendment rights. However, it is well-established that individuals may enter into valid contracts which restrict First Amendment rights or other constitutional rights. <a href="https://linear.com

the Church absent injunctive relief is the irreparable harm of being victimized by Armstrong's violations, while others with interests adverse to the Church benefit in legal proceedings from an unfettered flow of breached obligations, wrongful disclosures and fiduciary infidelity. Furthermore, California courts have long recognized the public interest in encouraging settlements (which necessitates that such settlement agreements be enforceable on the parties concerned). Phelps v. Kozakar (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1078, 1081, 194 Cal.Rptr. 872, 874. Thus, the balancing of the equities unquestionably favors the Church.

IV.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated herein, the Church has suffered substantial and irreparable

15(...continued)

agreement); In re Steinberg (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 14, 20, 195 Cal.Rptr. 613, 617 (movie maker's First Amendment right to disseminate his movie was limited by agreement to submit movie for editing prior to release); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. (1972) 405 U.S. 174, 185, 187, 92 S.Ct. 775, 782, 783, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (debtor may waive rights to prejudgment notice).

Negative or restrictive covenants in contracts have also been held valid in a number of instances such as non-disclosure of trade secrets and enforcement of noncompete agreements which involve the voluntary relinquishment of First Amendment rights. In all these instances, the injunctive power of the Court has been used to enforce the terms of the agreements. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Stidham (5th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 1098 (broker permanently enjoined from violating restrictive covenant in contract requiring that records remain confidential); Zoecon Industries v. American Stockman Tag Company (5th Cir. 1983) 713 F.2d 1174 (permanent injunction issued against use of trade secrets on breach of confidential relationship with former employer); NCH Corporation v. Share Corp. (5th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 1540 (court had power to enforce contact by granting injunction restraining employees from competing with former employer).

Indeed, in issuing the preliminary injunction herein, Judge Sohigian correctly noted that:

The law appropriately favors settlement agreements. Obviously, one limitation on freedom of contract is "public policy." . . . Litigants have a substantial range of contractual freedom, even to the extent of agreeing not to assert or exercise rights which they might otherwise have.

Order of May 28, 1992, ¶ 8.

harm due to Armstrong's deliberate and systematic violations of the Agreement, and will continue to do so absent issuance of a permanent injunction. The facts of the making of the Agreement, performance by the Church, Armstrong's repeated breaches, and Armstrong's dedication to continuing to breach the Agreement are undisputed. A preliminary injunction has already issued, which has restrained Armstrong from violating some of the provisions of the Agreement, but which has not prevented him from additional breaches. Issuance of a permanent injunction is necessary for plaintiff to obtain meaningful relief.

For all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff requests that the Court enter a permanent injunction enforcing the terms of the Agreement, according to the Proposed Order filed herewith.

Dated: March 2, 1993

Respectfully submitted,

Andrew H. Wilson WILSON, RYAN AND CAMPILONGO

BOWLES & MOXON

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY

INTERNATIONAL

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action. My business address is 6255 Sunset Blvd., Suite 2000, Hollywood, CA 90028.

On March 2, 1993 I served the foregoing document described as PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF THE TWELFTH CAUSE OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF on interested parties in this action as follows:

- [] by placing the true copies thereof in sealed envelopes as stated on the attached mailing list;
- [X] by placing [] the original [X] a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

Ford Greene Hub Law Offices 711 Sir Francis Drake Boulevard San Anselmo, CA 94960-1949

[X] BY MAIL -- I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.

Executed on March 2, 1993 at Los Angeles, California

nacouted on Naton 2, 1999 at hos Ang	cies, carronna.
[] BY PERSONAL SERVICE I deliver the offices of the addressee.	red such envelopes by hand to
Executed on, at Los Ange	eles, California.
[X] (State) I declare under penalty California that the above is true ar	
[] (Federal) I declare that I am emember of the bar of this court at was made.	
Type or Print Name	Signature

PROOF OF SERVICE

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- [] by placing the true copies thereof in sealed envelopes as stated on the attached mailing list;
- [X] by placing [] the original [X] a true copy thereof in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

Paul Morantz P.O. Box 511 Pacific Palisades, CA 90272
[] BY MAIL I deposited such envelope in the mail at Los Angeles, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid.
Executed on at Los Angeles, California.
[x] BY PERSONAL SERVICE I delivered such envelopes by hand the offices of the addressee.
Executed on March 2, 1993, at Los Angeles, California.
[X] (State) I declare under penalty of the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.
[] (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made.
Type or Print Name Signature